Advanced Microeconomic Theory (3rd edit... | WHSmith Books
Advanced Microeconomic Theory (3rd edition)

Advanced Microeconomic Theory (3rd edition)

By: Geoffrey A. Jehle (author), Philip J. Reny (author)Paperback

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PREFACE PART 1: ECONOMIC AGENTS CHAPTER 1: CONSUMER THEORY1.1 Primitive Notions1.2 Preferences and Utility1.2.1 Preference Relations1.2.2 The Utility Function1.3 The Consumer's Problem1.4 Indirect Utility and Expenditure1.4.1 The Indirect Utility Function1.4.2 The Expenditure Function1.4.3 Relations Between the Two1.5 Properties of Consumer Demand1.5.1 Relative Prices and Real Income1.5.2 Income and Substitution Effects1.5.3 Some Elasticity Relations1.6 Exercises CHAPTER 2: TOPICS IN CONSUMER THEORY2.1 Duality: A Closer Look2.1.1 Expenditure and Consumer Preferences 2.1.2 Convexity and Monotonicity 2.1.3 Indirect Utility and Consumer Preferences 2.2 Integrability 2.3 Revealed Preference 2.4 Uncertainty 2.4.1 Preferences 2.4.2 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility 2.4.3 Risk Aversion 2.5 Exercises CHAPTER 3: THEORY OF THE FIRM3.1 Primitive Notions 3.2 Production 3.2.1 Returns to Scale and Varying Proportions 3.3 Cost 3.4 Duality in Production 3.5 The Competitive Firm3.5.1 Profit Maximisation 3.5.2 The Profit Function 3.6 Exercises PART 2: MARKETS AND WELFARE CHAPTER 4: PARTIAL EQUALIBRIUM4.1 Perfect Competition 4.2 Imperfect Competition 4.2.1 Cournot Oligopoly 4.2.2 Bertrand Oligopoly 4.2.3 Monopolistic Competition 4.3 Equilibrium and Welfare4.3.1 Price and Individual Welfare4.3.2 Efficiency of the Competitive Outcome 4.3.3 Efficiency and Total Surplus Maximisation 4.4 Exercises CHAPTER 5: GENERAL EQUALIBRIUM5.1 Equilibrium in Exchange 5.2 Equilibrium in Competitive Market Systems 5.2.1 Existence of Equilibrium5.2.2 Efficiency5.3 Equilibrium in Production 5.3.1 Producers 5.3.2 Consumers 5.3.3 Equilibrium 5.3.4 Welfare5.4 Contingent Plans5.4.1 Time 5.4.2 Uncertainty 5.4.3 Walrasian Equilibrium with Contingent Commodities 5.5 Core and Equilibria 5.5.1 Replica Economies 5.6 Exercises CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE6.1 The Nature of the Problem6.2 Social Choice and Arrow's Theorem 6.2.1 A Diagrammatic Proof 6.3 Measurability, Comparability, and Some Possibilities6.3.1 The Rawlsian Form 6.3.2 The Utilitarian Form6.3.3 Flexible Forms6.4 Justice 6.5 Social Choice and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem 6.6 Exercises PART 3: STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR CHAPTER 7: GAME THEORY7.1 Strategic Decision Making 7.2 Strategic Form Games 7.2.1 Dominant Strategies 7.2.2 Nash Equilibrium7.2.3 Incomplete Information 7.3 Extensive Form Games 7.3.1 Game Trees: A Diagrammatic Representation 7.3.2 An Informal Analysis of Take-Away 7.3.3 Extensive Form Game Strategies 7.3.4 Strategies and Payoffs 7.3.5 Games of Perfect Information and Backward Induction Strategies 7.3.6 Games of Imperfect Information and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 7.3.7 Sequential Equilibrium 7.4 Exercises CHAPTER 8: INFORMATION ECONOMICS 8.1 Adverse Selection 8.1.1 Information and the Efficiency of Market Outcomes 8.1.2 Signalling 8.1.3 Screening 8.2 Moral Hazard and the Principal-Agent Problem 8.2.1 Symmetric Information 8.2.2 Asymmetric Information 8.3 Information and Market Performance 8.4 Exercises CHAPTER 9: AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGN 9.1 The Four Standard Auctions 9.2 The Independent Private Values Model9.2.1 Bidding Behaviour in a First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction 9.2.2 Bidding Behaviour in a Dutch Auction 9.2.3 Bidding Behaviour in a Second-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction 9.2.4 Bidding Behaviour in an English Auction 9.2.5 Revenue Comparisons 9.3 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem 9.3.1 Incentive-Compatible Direct Selling Mechanisms: A Characterisation 9.3.2 Efficiency 9.4 Designing a Revenue Maximising Mechanism 9.4.1 The Revelation Principle 9.4.2 Individual Rationality 9.4.3 An Optimal Selling Mechanism 9.4.4 A Closer Look at the Optimal Selling Mechanism 9.4.5 Efficiency, Symmetry, and Comparison to the Four Standard Auctions 9.5 Designing Allocatively Efficient Mechanisms 9.5.1 Quasi-Linear Utility and Private Values 9.5.2 Ex Post Pareto Efficiency9.5.3 Direct Mechanisms, Incentive Comparability and the Revelation Principle9.5.4 The Vickery-Clarke-Groves Mechanism9.5.5 Achieving a Balanced Budget: Expected Externality Mechanisms9.5.6 Property Rights, Outside Options, and Individual Rationality Contraints9.5.7 The IR-VCG Mechanism: Sufficiency of Expected Surplus9.6 Exercises MATHEMATICAL APPENDICES CHAPTER A1: SETS AND MAPPINGSA1.1 Elements of Logic A1.1.1 Necessity and Sufficiency A1.1.2 Theorems and Proofs A1.2 Elements of Set Theory A1.2.1 Notation and Basic Concepts A1.2.2 Convex SetsA1.2.3 Relations and Functions A1.3 A Little Topology A1.3.1 Continuity A1.3.2 Some Existence Theorems A1.4 Real-Valued Functions A1.4.1 Related Sets A1.4.2 Concave Functions A1.4.3 Quasiconcave Functions A1.4.4 Convex and Quasiconvex FunctionsA1.5 Exercises CHAPTER A2: CALCULUS AND OPTIMISATION A2.1 Calculus A2.1.1 Functions of a Single VariableA2.1.2 Functions of Several Variables A2.1.3 Homogeneous Functions A2.2 Optimisation A2.2.1 Real-Valued Functions of Several Variables A2.2.2 Second-Order Conditions A2.3 Constrained Optimisation A2.3.1 Equality Constraints A2.3.2 Lagrange's Method A2.3.3 Geometric Interpretation A2.3.4 Second-Order Conditions A2.3.5 Inequality Constraints A2.3.6 Kuhn-Tucker Conditions A2.4 Optimality TheoremsA2.5 Separation Theorems A2.6 Exercises LIST OF THEOREMSLIST OF DEFINITIONSHINTS AND ANSWERSREFERENCESINDEX

Product Details

  • ISBN13: 9780273731917
  • Format: Paperback
  • Number Of Pages: 672
  • ID: 9780273731917
  • weight: 1271
  • ISBN10: 0273731912
  • edition: 3rd edition

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