Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
By: Peter D. Feaver (author)Hardback
More than 4 weeks availability
How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nationstate. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior.
Peter D. Feaver is Associate Professor of Political Science, Duke University.
Preface 1. Introduction 2. Huntington's Cold War Puzzle 3. The Informal Agency Theory 4. A Formal Agency Model of Civil-Military Relations 5. An Agency Theory Solution to the Cold War Puzzle 6. Explaining the Post-Cold War "Crisis," 1990-2000 7. Using Agency Theory to Explore the Use of Force in the Post-ColdWar Era 8. Conclusion Notes References Index
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- ID: 9780674017610
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