This book dispels two common myths about the American-Israeli patron-client relationship -- that arms transfers to Israel have been motivated by American domestic politics rather than national interests and that these arms transfers have come without any political strings attached to them. The first part of the book describes and analyses the institutionalisation of the American-Israeli arms pipeline during the Johnson administration, demonstrating conclusively in the process that arms transfers to the Jewish state were based primarily on American national interests. The second part of the book consists of four case studies that clearly reveal that American arms transfers to Israel, whether in wartime or in peacetime, have always come with a diplomatic price tag attached to them. The book is based largely on American government documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, from the Lyndon B Johnson Presidential Library, and from the United States National Archives.
David Rodman has written numerous articles, review essays, and book reviews on various aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict for professional journals, including Middle Eastern Studies, The Journal of Strategic Studies, MERIA Journal, Israel Affairs, Defence Studies, and Air & Space Power Chronicles. He has also contributed chapters to Israel: From War to Peace?, Review Essays in Israel Studies: Books on Israel, and Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security.
Introduction: The American-Israeli Relationship in Historical Perspective; The Israeli Quest for Arms: Western Europe and the United States; Armoured Breakthrough: The 1965 Sale of M-48 Patton Tanks to Israel; One Step Forward and One Step Backward: The 1966 Sale of A-4 Skyhawk Aircraft to Israel and the Post- 1967 Six-Day War Arms Embargo; Air Support: The 1968 Sale of F-4 Phantom Aircraft to Israel; National Interests or Domestic Politics?: The Rationale Behind American Arms Sales to Israel in the 1960s; The 1967 Six-Day War: A Delayed "Green Light" for Pre-emption; The 1969-1970 War of Attrition: Restricting lsrael's Military Options; The 1973 Yom Kippur War: Limiting Israel's Military Victory; Peacetime Arms Transfers: The Nixon, Carter and Reagan Administrations; Conclusion: The Costs of an Alliance and the Benefits of a Patron-Client Relationship; Index.