It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive 'cognitive phenomenology'-that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious
thought has cognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.
Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the
existence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first-person knowledge of thought, the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the
debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of the very nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake.
Tim Bayne is Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Catherine's College, Oxford. His main research interest is the philosophy of cognitive science, and he has co-edited The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009) and Delusions and Self-Deception: Affective Influences on Belief Formation (Psychology Press, 2008). Michelle Montague lectures in philosophy at the University of Bristol. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and metaphysics, and she has published in these areas in philosophy journals including Nous, Philosophical Studies, and Analysis. She is currently writing a book on the notion of content, with particular reference to the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality.
Contents ; 1. Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction ; 2. The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology ; 3. From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed ; 4. Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content ; 5. On The Phenomenology of Thought ; 6. The Phenomenology of Particularity ; 7. Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content ; 8. The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology ; 9. A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology ; 10. On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia ; 11. Phenomenal Thought ; 12. Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology ; 13. Cognitive Phenomenology: real life ; 14. Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? ; 15. Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking