This book offers a new theoretical framework for understanding the mediator role played by constitutional courts in democratic conflict solving. The book proposes an informational theory of constitutional review in which constitutional courts obtain, process, and transmit information to parties in a way that reduces the uncertainty causing their conflict. The substantive focus of the book is the role of constitutional courts in democracies where the armed forces are fighting internal armed conflicts of different types: Colombia, Peru, and Mexico in Latin America and also Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan. Through detailed analyses of the political context, civil-military relations, and the constitutional jurisprudence on military autonomy and the regulation of the use of force the book shows that constitutional courts can be instrumental in striking a democratically accepted balance between the exercise of civilian authority and the legitimate needs of the military in its pursuit of order and national security.
Julio Rios-Figueroa is Associate Professor of Political Science at Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (CIDE), Mexico City.
1. Constitutional courts and the armed forces; 2. A theory of constitutional courts as mediators; 3. Constitutional jurisprudence on military autonomy in Colombia, 1958-2013; 4. Constitutional jurisprudence on military autonomy in Peru, 1979-2013; 5. Constitutional jurisprudence on military autonomy in Mexico, 1917-2013; 6. Judicial regulation of the use of force in Colombia, Peru, and Mexico; 7. Constitutional courts as mediators beyond Latin America; 8. Constitutional courts and democratic conflict-solving.