This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.
The expert contributions are underpinned by the notion of moving economic thinking away from the analysis of the logic of a situation given a set of well-established and well-enforced `rules of the game', towards a deeper analysis of the logic behind the selection of the rules of the game themselves. Within this context, the theme of choice between rules (as well as the more conventional analysis within rules) across historical time and place, and in various thought experiments and conceptual situations, is explored in detail. Extensive case studies back theory with empirical evidence, and topics discussed include: the foundations of constitutional economics; constitutional political economy; political competition and voting; public choice and public policy; and extensions to public choice theory.
This stimulating book will prove a thought-provoking read for academics and both under- and post-graduate students in the fields of economics (particularly public choice and Austrian economics), public policy and political science.
Edited by Francisco Cabrillo, Department of Applied Economics, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain and Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro, Department of Applied Economics, University of Valencia, Spain
Contents: Foreword Peter Boettke Introduction Francisco Cabrillo and Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro PART I: FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1. Presuppositions in the Evaluation of Rules James M. Buchanan 2. Buchanan, Hobbes and Contractarianism: The Supply of Rules? Geoffrey Brennan and Giuseppe Eusepi PART II: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CASE STUDIES 3. Economic Governance in the European Union. A Problem of Legitimacy Francisco Cabrillo and Sean Fitzpatrick 4. Early Spanish Liberalism and Constitutional Political Economy: The Cadiz Constitution of 1812 Roger D. Congleton 5. Reforms and Decentralization: Friends or Foes? Pierre Salmon 6. Democracy-Preserving Institutions: The Quasi-federal System of South Africa Giorgio Brosio PART III: POLITICAL COMPETITION AND VOTING 7. On Machiavelli's Conspiracy Paradoxes Manfred J. Holler 8. A General Measure of the `Effective' Number of Parties in a Political System Vani K. Borooah 9. Party Competition and Electoral Turnout: Downs's Calculus in a Multiparty System Juha Helin and Hannu Nurmi PART IV: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 10. The Political Economy of Dutch Disease: A Survey Martin Paldam 11. Higher Education as Private Good and as Quasi Public Good: The Case of Italy Silvia Fedeli and Francesco Forte 12. The Actual Role of Government Intervention for the Recovery of the Italian Economy Gian Cesare Romagnoli 13. Government Bankruptcy of Balkan Nations and the Consequences for Money and Inflation Before 1914: A Comparative Analysis Peter Bernholz PART V: EXTENSIONS IN PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 14. Regulator Preferences and Lobbying Efforts in Rent-seeking Contests Juan D. Montoro-Pons 15. Cooperation in Multilateral PDs: Self-selected vs. Pre-defined Groups Viktor J. Vanberg 16. Voluntary Provision of Public Goods Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro 17. Awards Play an Important Role Bruno S. Frey and Susanne Neckermann 18. The Optimal Babel: An Economic Framework for the Analysis of Dynamic Language Rights Bengt-Arne Wickstroem 19. A Theory of Conversion to Exclusive Religions and Political Faiths Mario Ferrero Index