This is the most detailed discussion of whether Japan submitted to an unconditional surrender after WWII and how the American pursuit of this goal lengthened the war. Conventionally, Imperial Japan is said to have surrendered unconditionally on August 14, 1945. The same is said of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and other Axis belligerents. But is this the case? Is it possible for a country with millions of citizens to surrender 'unconditionally'? Are there not always conditions? Because such a demand inevitably lengthens the war, how can it ever be justified? How can a leader tell his countrymen that he plans to increase the death and destruction of a war merely to impose an 'unconditional surrender' on an enemy? In this book, Professor Hallett explores the historical and moral paradoxes created by President Roosevelt's demand for an unconditional surrender. How his demand lengthened the war. How the Axis powers surrendered on conditions, albeit minimal conditions, and paradoxically, how Roosevelt's demand was his greatest contribution to the winning of the war.
1. Foreword by George Simson; 2. Beams and Motes; 3. Roosevelt's Allies: Muted Opposition; 4. A Short History of Unconditional Surrender; 5. The American Experience in the Second World War; 6. Imperial Japan: Searching for Terms; 7. Imperial Japan: Finding Conditions; 8. General Marshall's Concerns; 9. Roosevelt's Persistence: The Lesser Evil; 10. The Politics of the Potsdam Ultimatum.