Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions organize the literature. What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate assertion? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate action? With the tremendous but disparate growth of the literature on
epistemic norms, the time is ripe for a volume bringing together papers by established and emerging figures, with an eye toward the interconnections among our three questions. That is precisely what this volume seeks to do.
Clayton Littlejohn is Lecturer in philosophy at King's College London. He specializes in epistemology and ethical theory. In his first book, Justification and the Truth-Connection (Cambridge University Press, 2012), he defended an account of justification that was both deontological and externalist. John Turri is Assistant Professor of philosophy at the University of Waterloo (Canada). He specializes in epistemology, cognitive science and philosophy of language.
Introduction ; 1. Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm ; 2. Lenient Accounts of Warranted Assertability ; 3. Having False Reasons ; 4. On Knowing One's Reason ; 5. Knowledge versus Truth ; 6. Epistemic Normativity ; 7. The Unity of Reason ; 8. Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion ; 9. Epistemic Agency and Judgment ; 10. You Gotta Believe ; 11. The Spectra of Epistemic Norms ; 12. Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action ; 13. The Dual-Aspect Norms of Belief and Assertion: A Virtue Approach to Epistemic Norms ; Index