This book will be of interest to all decision-makers and analysts concerned with supply contracts. The primary focus of this study is on one particular type of supply contract, namely, the exclusive dealing contract. Its essence is the agreement by a seller (or a lessor) and/or buyer (or lessee) to transact only with the other party for the duration of the contract. This analysis attempts to discern the economic reasons why that type of supply contract was utilized in individual cases, and to aggregate the results in a systematic fashion. It covers all the federal antitrust cases involving exclusive dealing that reached the Court of Appeals level and/or the Supreme Court through 1986. For the interested reader, careful referencing and an extensive bibliography provide easy access to treatments that are more theoretically disposed.
Gregg P. Frasco is Assistant Professor of Economics at Ohio University, Athens.
chapter 1 Motivations for Exclusive Dealing that are Independent of Tying Contract Considerations. Exclusive Dealing Within the Context of Tie-Ins. The Methodology for the Case Study. The Individual Antitrust Cases. The Results of the Case Study. and Areas for Furt