The Gettier Problem has shaped most of the fundamental debates in epistemology for more than fifty years. Before Edmund Gettier published his famous 1963 paper, it was generally presumed that knowledge was equivalent to true belief supported by adequate evidence. Gettier presented a powerful challenge to that presumption. This led to the development and refinement of many prominent epistemological theories, for example, defeasibility theories, causal theories,
conclusive-reasons theories, tracking theories, epistemic virtue theories, and knowledge-first theories. The debate about the appropriate use of intuition to provide evidence in all areas of philosophy began as a debate about the epistemic status of the 'Gettier intuition'. The differing accounts of
epistemic luck are all rooted in responses to the Gettier Problem. The discussions about the role of false beliefs in the production of knowledge are directly traceable to Gettier's paper, as are the debates between fallibilists and infallibilists. Indeed, it is fair to say that providing a satisfactory response to the Gettier Problem has become a litmus test of any adequate account of knowledge even those accounts that hold that the Gettier Problem rests on mistakes of various sorts. This
volume presents a collection of essays by twenty-six experts, including some of the most influential philosophers of our time, on the various issues that arise from Gettier's challenge to the analysis of knowledge. Explaining Knowledge sets the agenda for future work on the central problem of
Rodrigo Borges is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Claudio de Almeida is Professor of Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Peter D. Klein is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University.
Preface Introduction Edmund Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? I: Solving the Gettier Problem 1: E. J. Coffman: Gettiered Belief 2: Peter D. Klein: The Nature of Knowledge 3: Duncan Pritchard: Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue: Resolving the Gettier Problem 4: Susanna Schellenberg: Perceptual Capacities, Knowledge, and Gettier Cases 5: Robert K. Shope: Chained to the Gettier Problem-a Useful Falsehood? 6: Jonathan Vogel: Accident, Evidence, and Knowledge II: The Gettier Legacy 7: Risto Hilpinen: Sed ubi Socrates currit? On the Gettier Problem before Gettier 8: John L. Kvanvig: Lessons from Gettier 9: Keith Lehrer: Defeasible Reasoning and Representation: The Lesson of Gettier 10: Linda Zagzebski: The Lesson of Gettier III: Gettier and Philosophical Methodology 11: Jessica Brown: The Gettier Case and Intuition 12: Alvin Goldman: Gettier and the Epistemic Appraisal of Philosophical Intuition 13: Ernest Sosa: The Metaphysical Gettier Problem and the X-Phi Critique 14: Peter Blouw, Wesley Buckwalter, and John Turri: Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy 15: Jonathan M. Weinberg: Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-fitting: A Methodological Argument for JTB? IV: Gettier and Inferential Knowledge16: Rodrigo Borges: Inferential Knowledge and the Gettier Conjecture 17: Claudio de Almeida: Knowledge, Benign Falsehoods, and the Gettier Problem 18: Branden Fitelson: Closure, Counter-Closure, and Inferential Knowledge 19: John Hawthorne and Dani Rabinowitz: Knowledge and False Belief V: Dissolving the Gettier Problem 20: Fred Dretske: Golden Gettier: What We (Should Have) Learned 21: Richard Foley: The Value of Knowledge and the Gettier Game 22: Stephen Hetherington: Gettier Cases: Transworld Identity and Counterparts 23: Sherrilyn Roush: The Difference between Knowledge and Understanding