In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the business model of international banks is under pressure. Regulators across the world are retrenching to national lines by applying restrictions on cross-border banking. Applying game theory, this book develops a model of the financial trilemma to understand the co-ordination failure among regulators. It also provides governance solutions to overcome this co-ordination failure. The goal is to offer a long-term perspective on international banking for regulators and academics. The book combines academic insights and policy issues.
Dean of the Duisenberg School of Finance and Professor of Finance, Banking and Insurance, VU University Amsterdam
Preface ; Acknowledgments ; List of Figures ; List of Tables ; Abbreviations ; Introduction ; 1 Governance Challenges for Global Finance ; 1.1 Governance Challenges ; 1.2 International Policy Proposals ; 1.3 Conclusion ; 2 The Financial Trilemma: Theory ; 2.1 Policy Coordination ; 2.2 Modelling the Financial Trilemma ; 2.3 Conclusion ; 3 The Rise of International Banking ; 3.1 Strategy and Business Models ; 3.2 Empirical Evidence on International Banking ; 3.3 Financial Safety Net ; 3.4 Conclusion ; 4 Failing the Financial Trilemma ; 4.1 Potential for Conflicts of Interests ; 4.2 Case Studies of International Bank Failures ; 4.3 Conclusion ; 5 Solving the Financial Trilemma ; 5.1 International Coordination ; 5.2 Comparing Coordination Mechanisms ; 5.3 Containing Moral Hazard ; 5.4 No Coordination ; 5.5 Conclusion ; 6 Political Economy ; 6.1 Key Role of Politicians ; 6.2 Position of Supervisors and Banks ; 6.3 Countries Take Different Approaches ; 6.4 Conclusion ; 7 Global Governance ; 7.1 Framework for Governance ; 7.2 European Governance ; 7.3 Global Governance ; 7.4 Conclusion ; Conclusions ; Bibliography ; Index