Why is competition between institutions usually viewed in a negative light, when competition is considered positive in most other economic contexts? The contributors to this volume introduce new perspectives on this issue, analytically and empirically exploring reasons for this perception.
Negative assessments of institutional competition emphasize that such competition may lead to a race to the bottom in terms of eroding government revenues, redistributing wealth from workers to capitalists, and limiting democracy by forcing politicians to prioritize international investment capital rather than working for their voters. In this volume, however, many of the essays draw attention to the positive learning and information effects. The contributors conclude that competition may actually lead to institutions becoming more efficient in allocating resources.
Students and scholars of economics, political economy, international relations and political science will find the book's non-traditional take on institutional competition a must-read, as will policy analysts and those with an interest in taxation and welfare states.
Edited by Andreas Bergh, Lund University and Research Institute of Industrial Economics and Rolf Hoeijer, The Government Offices of Sweden
Contents: Foreword Preface Andreas Bergh and Rolf Hoeijer 1. The Concept of Institutional Competition Rolf Hoeijer 2. A History of Thought on Institutional Competition Roland Vaubel 3. Learning Through Institutional Competition Michael Wohlgemuth 4. Institutional Competition: International Environment, Levels and Consequences Peter Bernholz 5. Can Competition Between Governments Enhance Democracy? Viktor J. Vanberg 6. Tax Competition and Tax Cartels Rolf Hoeijer 7. Fiscal Competition and the Optimization of Tax Revenues for Higher Growth Victoria Curzon-Price 8. A Race to the Bottom for the Big Welfare States? Andreas Bergh 9. Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth in OECD Countries Lars P. Feld 10. Asia's Giants in the World Economy: China and India Erich Weede Index