This new book explores the relationship between intelligence and command at the operational level of war, and the extent to which it nourished operational performance on the battlefield.
It does so through the medium of a fresh case study of the British Eighth Army's performance, under three different commanders, at several key points during the campaign in Italy. These comprise operations Husky and Baytown (the invasion of Sicily and Italy respectively), under Montgomery; the Eighth Army's part in the fourth battle of Cassino and the Gothic Line offensive, under Oliver Leese; and the final offensive in Italy, under Richard McCreery.
This book will be of much interest to students of the Second World War, intelligence studies, operational military history and strategic history.
Kevin Jones graduated from the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, before completing an MA in War Studies at King's College London. He recently obtained a PhD from UCL in Military History.
@contents: Selected Contents: Introduction 1. The Application of Intelligence to Military Operations in the British Army during the Second World War 2. Eighth Army's Intelligence Organisation and Performance during the Italian Campaign 3. Preparing for the Worst - Montgomery, Intelligence, and the Planning of Operation BAYTOWN 4. Leese, Intelligence, and the Planning of the Liri Valley and Gothic Line Offensives 5. Leese, Intelligence, and the Opening Phase of the Liri Valley and Gothic Line Offensives 6. McCreery, Intelligence, and the Final Offensive in Italy Conclusion Notes and References Bibliography Index