International Criminal Justice and the Politics of Compliance

International Criminal Justice and the Politics of Compliance

By: Christopher K. Lamont (author)Hardback

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Description

International Criminal Justice and the Politics of Compliance provides a comprehensive study of compliance with legal obligations derived from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's (ICTY) Statute and integrates theoretical debates on compliance into international justice scholarship. Through the use of three models of compliance based on coercion, self-interest and norms, Christopher Lamont explores both the domestic politics of war crimes indictments and efforts by external actors such as the European Union, the United States and the Tribunal itself to induce compliance outcomes. He examines whether compliance outcomes do or do not translate into a changed normative understanding of international criminal justice on the part of target states.

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About Author

Dr Christopher K Lamont, Assistant Professor at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands.

Contents

Contents: Preface; International criminal Justice and the politics of state compliance; Part I State Compliance: Croatia: a coercive model for compliance: Serbia: the politics of denial; Macedonia: voluntary compliance? Part II Compliance Beyond the State: Bosnia-Herzegovina: compliance under diffuse sovereignty; The United Nations interim administration mission in Kosovo: international justice in an international protectorate; Conclusions: the politics of compliance with tribunal orders; Appendices; References; Index.

Product Details

  • publication date: 28/02/2010
  • ISBN13: 9780754679653
  • Format: Hardback
  • Number Of Pages: 240
  • ID: 9780754679653
  • weight: 576
  • ISBN10: 0754679659

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