A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs.
Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions.
This cutting-edge work will be an unmatched resource for scholars and students of corruption, professionals in international aid and finance organizations, and scholars and professionals with more general interests in economic and political development.
Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Henry R. Luce Professor Emeritus of Law and Political Science, Yale University, US and Tina Soreide, Professor, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), Norway
Contents: Introduction Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Soreide PART I: GENERAL OVERVIEWS 1. Corruption and Sustainable Development Toke S. Aidt 2. Curbing Corruption with Political Institutions Joshua D. Potter and Margit Tavits PART II: PROCUREMENT AND CORRUPTION 3. Delusion, Deception and Corruption in Major Infrastructure Projects: Causes, Consequences and Cures Bent Flyvbjerg and Eamonn Molloy 4. Corruption and Collusion: Strategic Complements in Procurement Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky 5. A Fighting Chance Against Corruption in Public Procurement? Gustavo Piga PART III: PRIVATIZATION AND SELF-DEALING IN PRIVATE FIRMS 6. Public versus Private Governance and Performance: Evidence from Public Utility Service Provision Maria Vagliasindi 7. Privatization of Rent-Generating Industries and Corruption Emmanuelle Auriol and Stephane Straub 8. Risks of Wrongdoing in Public Companies and Ways to Cope with Them: The Case of Brazil Dante Mendes Aldrighi PART IV: PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 9. Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation Antonio Estache and Liam Wren-Lewis 10. Is There an Anti-corruption Agenda in Regulation? Insights from Colombian and Zambian Water Regulation Frederic Boehm PART V: MICRO-ANALYTIC RESEARCH: HOUSEHOLD AND FIRMS 11. Field Experimentation and the Study of Corruption Leonid V. Peisakhin 12. Oil, Corruption, and Vote-buying: A Review of the Case of Sao Tome and Principe Pedro C. Vicente 13. Conflict and Corruption in International Trade: Who Helped Iraq Circumvent United Nations Sanctions? Yujin Jeong and Robert J. Weiner 14. Evidence from the Firm: A New Approach to Understanding Corruption Shawn Cole and Anh Tran 15. Does Respondent Reticence Affect the Results of Corruption Surveys? Evidence from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Nigeria Bianca Clausen, Aart Kraay and Peter Murrell PART VI: POLICY INITIATIVES: CRITIQUES AND EVALUATIONS 16. On Best and Not So Good Practices for Addressing High-level Corruption Worldwide: An Empirical Assessment Edgardo Buscaglia 17. Why Multi-Stakeholder Groups Succeed and Fail Rory Truex and Tina Soreide 18. `Red Flags of Corruption' in World Bank Projects: An Analysis of Infrastructure Contracts Charles Kenny and Maria Musatova 19. Anti-Corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to Curb Corruption? Francesca Recanatini Index