Economic research on corruption aims both to isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties, and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb harms and enhance benefits. In this comprehensive Handbook, top scholars in the field provide specially commissioned essays, both theoretical and empirical, exploring both types of research.
The Handbook begins with an introductory essay by the editor, followed by two chapters written by leading exponents of cross-country research. However, the focus of the Handbook is on research at the micro level, where policy can be made and evaluated. These microeconomic studies fall into several overlapping categories. The first group includes studies that link corrupt incentives to institutional structures, particularly the organization of the state. The second draws implications from surveys of households or businesses and from controlled experiments. The third concentrates on particular sectors such as education, tax administration, public works, customs services, and pharmaceuticals. Finally, two chapters assess corruption in the transition away from socialism in Europe and Asia.
Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale University, US
Contents: Introduction and Overview Susan Rose-Ackerman PART I: CORRUPTION AND POOR GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 1. Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries? Johann Graf Lambsdorff 2. Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi 3. Measuring Institutions Christopher Woodruff PART II: CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 4. Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions Ray Fisman and Roberta Gatti 5. Democratic Institutions and Corruption: Incentives and Constraints in Politics Jana Kunicova 6. Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee 7. Corruption, Hierarchies and Bureaucratic Structure Ajit Mishra 8. Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries: The Limits of Conventional Economic Analysis Mushtaq H. Khan PART III: CORRUPTION IN THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM 9. The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Programs: Preliminary Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition Countries Alan Rousso and Franklin Steves 10. Corruption in China and Russia Compared: Different Legacies of Central Planning Jens Andvig PART IV: SURVEYS AND EXPERIMENTS 11. Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt Than Others? Jennifer Hunt 12. Corruption and the Demand for Regulating Capitalists Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch 13. Corruption in International Business Transactions: The Perspective of Norwegian Firms Tina Soreide 14. Laboratory Experiments on Corruption Klaus Abbink PART V: SECTORAL ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES 15. How Corruption Affects Service Delivery and What Can Be Done About It Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson 16. Corruption and the Management of Public Works in Italy Miriam Golden and Lucio Picci 17. Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda Odd-Helge Fjeldstad 18. The Economics of Anti-Corruption: Lessons from a Widespread Customs Reform Dean Yang 19. Prescription for Abuse? Pharmaceutical Selection in Bulgarian Healthcare Patrick Meagher Index