This book presents a comprehensive view of recent developments in the theory of international trade agreements and political economy, by focusing on research by Raymond Riezman. This pioneering work introduced terms of trade effects and strategic behavior to the theory of international trade agreements. This is complemented by a careful analysis of how politics affects international trade agreements.The book brings together work which focuses on the question of why international trade agreements occur and what forms they take.
Tariffs and Trade Agreements: A 3X3 Model of Customs Unions; Tariff Retaliation from a Strategic Viewpoint; Customs Unions and the Core; Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?; Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions; Dynamic Tariffs with Asymmetric Information; Understanding the Welfare Implications of Preferential Trade Agreements; A Strategic and Welfare Theoretic Analysis of Free Trade Areas; How Often are Propositions on the Effects of Regional Trade Agreements Theoretical Curiosa?; Free Trade: What are the Terms-of-Trade Effects?; Political Economy and Voting Models: Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments; Seniority in Legislature; Political Reform and Trade Policy; The Sources of Protectionist Drift in Representative Democracies; Minorities and Storable Votes; International Trade Topics: Uncertainty and the Choice of Trade Policy in Oligopolistic Industries; An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade; The Principles of Exchange Rate Determination in an International Finance Experiment; Trade Shocks and Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Africa; Trade, and the Distribution of Human Capital.