John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr., Reinhard Selten, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling: 5 (Pioneering Papers of the Nobel Memorial Laureates in

John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr., Reinhard Selten, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling: 5 (Pioneering Papers of the Nobel Memorial Laureates in

By: Chris Mulhearn (editor), Howard R. Vane (editor)Hardback

1 - 2 weeks availability

Description

These volumes not only provide a treasure house of material of high intrinsic worth, but also help us to understand what kind of approaches and ideas have been successful in persuading other economists, and thereby provide valuable material for understanding the evolution of the discipline. The idea behind this series of volumes is brilliant.

Create a review

Contents

Contents:AcknowledgementsGeneral IntroductionPART I JOHN C. HARSANYI Introduction to Part IHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn1. John C. Harsanyi (1967), 'Games With Incomplete Information Played By BayesianA" Players, I-III. Part I. The Basic Model'2. John C. Harsanyi (1968a), 'Games With Incomplete Information Played By BayesianA" Players, Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points'3. John C. Harsanyi (1968b), 'Games With Incomplete Information Played By 'Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game'PART II JOHN F. NASH Jr. Introduction to Part IIHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn4. John F. Nash Jr. (1950a), 'Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games'5. John F. Nash Jr. (1950b), 'The Bargaining Problem'6. John Nash (1951), 'Non-Cooperative Games'7. John Nash (1953), 'Two-Person Cooperative Games'PART III REINHARD SELTEN Introduction to Part IIIHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn8. Reinhard Selten (1975), 'Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games'9. Reinhard Selten (1983), 'A Model of Oligopolistic Size, Structure and Profitability'10. Reinhard Selten and Peter Hammerstein (1984), 'Gaps in Harley's Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of Tit for TatA"'11. Reinhard Selten (1990), 'Bounded Rationality'12. Reinhard Selten, Michael Mitzkewitz and Gerald R. Uhlich (1997), 'Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players'PART IV ROBERT J. AUMANN Introduction to Part IVHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn13. Robert J. Aumann (1959), 'Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games'14. Robert J. Aumann and Michael B. Maschler ([1966], 1995), 'Game Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament'15. Robert J. Aumann (1974), 'Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies'16. Robert J. Aumann (1976), 'Agreeing to Disagree'17. Robert J. Aumann and Lloyd L. Shapley (1976), 'Long-Term Competition: A Game Theoretic Analysis'18. Robert J. Aumann (1987), 'Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality'PART V THOMAS C. SCHELLINGIntroduction to Part VHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn19. Thomas C. Schelling (1956), 'An Essay on Bargaining'20. Thomas C. Schelling (1957), 'Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War'21. Thomas C. Schelling (1971), 'Dynamic Models of Segregation'22. Thomas C. Schelling (1980), 'The Intimate Contest for Self-Command'23. Thomas C. Schelling (1983), 'Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command'24. Thomas C. Schelling (1984), 'Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice'Name Index

Product Details

  • publication date: 01/02/2009
  • ISBN13: 9781847208415
  • Format: Hardback
  • Number Of Pages: 528
  • ID: 9781847208415
  • ISBN10: 184720841X

Delivery Information

  • Saver Delivery: Yes
  • 1st Class Delivery: Yes
  • Courier Delivery: Yes
  • Store Delivery: Yes

Prices are for internet purchases only. Prices and availability in WHSmith Stores may vary significantly

Close