This is a work in Kantian conceptual geography. It explores issues in analytic epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics in particular by appealing to theses drawn from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Those issues include the nature of the subjective, objective, and empirical; potential scopes of the subjective; what can (and cannot) be said about a subject-independent reality; analyticity, syntheticity, apriority, and aposteriority;
constitutive principles, acquisitive principles, and empirical claims; meaning, indeterminacy, and incommensurability; logically possible versus subjectively empirical worlds; and the nature of empirical truth.
Part One introduces two theses drawn from the Critique. The first, Empirical Dualism, concerns the subjective, objective, and empirical. The second, Subjective Principlism, concerns principles that might bear on the empirical. Part Two examines work of influential analytic philosophers to reveal how conceptually expansive the territory formed by Empirical Dualism and Subjective Principlism is. Part Three defends that territory by defending Empirical Dualism and Subjective Principlism
themselves. Part Four discloses two new lands within the territory that have so far remained uncharted. The first is a Kantian account of meaning, which is shown to be superior to other accounts of meaning in the analytic literature. The second are Kantian thoughts on truth, which illuminate the nature of
empirical truth itself. Finally Part Five shows how engaging in Kantian conceptual geography enriches epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics generally.
Nathaniel Goldberg is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Washington and Lee University, in Lexington, Virginia. He researches at the intersection of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language, and has an abiding interest in Kant.
TABLE OF CONTENTS ; Kantian Conceptual Geography ; PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: <"DOSTOEVSKY IS IMMORTAL!> " ; PART ONE: ESTABLISHING KANTIANISM'S BORDERS ; Chapter One: Dualism, Principlism, Kantianism ; 1 Kantianism ; 2 Kantianism and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason ; 3 Contrasting Views ; 4 The Plan of this Work ; 5 Naturalism ; PART TWO: EXPLORING KANTIAN TERRITORY ; Chapter Two: Philip Pettit ; 1 Response-Dependence ; 2 Pettit's Response-Dependence and Kantianism ; 3 From Kantianism to Noumenalism ; 4 Complicating the Debate ; 5 Pettit's Trilemma ; 6 Lessons for Kantian Conceptual Geography ; Chapter Three: Thomas Kuhn ; 1 Pettit and Kuhn on Learning Terms ; 2 Kuhn's Kantianism ; 3 Residual Issues concerning Kuhn's Kantianism ; 4 From Kantianism to Incommensurability ; 5 Lessons for Kantian Conceptual Geography ; Chapter Four: Donald Davidson ; 1 Radical Interpretation and Kantianism ; 2 Language Learning and Kantianism ; 3 Reconcilable and Irreconcilable Differences ; 4 The Curious Case of Swampman ; 5 Lessons for Kantian Conceptual Geography ; PART THREE: DEFENDING KANTIANISM'S BORDERS ; Chapter Five: Defending Dualism ; 1 Scheme/Content Dualism and (My) Dualism ; 2 First Half of Davidson's Argument against the Scheme Side ; 3 Second Half of Davidson's Argument against the Scheme Side ; 4 Evaluating that Second Half ; 5 Davidson's Argument against the Content Side ; 6 Dualism Defended ; 7 Lessons for Kantian Conceptual Geography ; Chapter Six: Defending Principlism ; 1 Kant's Principlism ; 2 Classic Arguments against Kant's Principlism ; 3 Carnap's Principlism ; 4 Quine's Arguments against Carnap's Principlism ; 5 Friedman's Principlism ; 6 Defending Friedman's Principlism ; 7 Principlism Defended ; 8 Lessons for Kantian Conceptual Geography ; PART FOUR: LOOKING FOR NEW LAND WITHIN KANTIANISM'S BORDERS ; Chapter Seven: From Dualism to a Kantian Account of Meaning ; 1 Kantian Account of Meaning ; 2 Kantian Account Explored ; 3 Platonic Realist Account of Meaning ; 4 Aristotelian Realist Account of Meaning ; 5 Berkeleian Idealist Account of Meaning ; 6 Lockean Hybridist Account of Meaning ; 7 Hegelian Pragmatist Account of Meaning ; 8 Lessons for Kantian Conceptual Geography ; Chapter Eight: Problems that a Kantianism Account of Meaning Faces ; 1 First Three Putative Problems: Indeterminacy, Relativism, and Incommensurability ; 2 Fourth and Fifth Putative Problem: Infinite Regression and Truth-Value Relativism ; 3 Sixth Putative Problem: Empirical-Property Relativism ; 4 Seventh Putative Problem: A Plurality of Empirical Worlds ; 5 Eighth Putative Problem: Movability between Empirical Worlds ; 6 The Unity of Reason ; 7 Lessons for Kantian Conceptual Geography ; Chapter Nine: From Principlism to Kantian Thoughts on Truth ; 1 Anthropocentric Kantian Thoughts from Kant ; 2 Ethnocentric Kantian Thoughts from Kuhn, Carnap, and Friedman ; 3 Un-Principled Kantian Thoughts from Pettit and Quine ; 4 Logocentric Kantian Thoughts from Davidson ; 5 The Historical Story in Full ; 6 Lessons for Kantian Conceptual Geography ; PART FIVE: LESSONS FOR US ; Chapter Ten: <"Some Idea Had Seized the Sovereignty of His Mind> " ; 1 Subjectivity, Objectivity, Principles, and the Empirical ; 2 Response-Dependence, Noumenalism, and Incommensurability ; 3 Subjective Scopes and Relevant Timing ; 4 Dualism and Principlism Defended ; 5 Meaning, Subjectively Empirical Worlds, and Empirical Truth ; 6 Dostoevsky Is (Still) Immortal! ; WORKS CITED ; INDEX