Is it acceptable to kill an animal that has been granted a pleasant life? This book rigorously explores the moral basis of the ideal of animal-friendly animal husbandry and sheds new light on utilitarian moral theory by pointing out the assumptions and implications of two different versions of utilitarianism, with surprising conclusions.
Tatjana Visak is a lecturer at the Centre for Human Bioethics at Monash University, Australia. Previously she has worked as a lecturer/researcher in ethics at various Dutch universities. Her special interests are Animal Ethics, Bioethics, Utilitarianism and Value Theory.
Series Editors' Preface Introduction 1. Utilitarianism and Animal Husbandry 2. Animals and the Harm of Death 3. The Replaceability Argument 4. Total View versus Prior Existence View 5. Can Existence be Better for a Being than Non-Existence? 6. Person-Affecting Restriction and Non-Identity Problem 7. Repugnant Conclusion and Expected Misery Argument 8. Veganism versus Animal-Friendly Animal Husbandry Conclusions Appendices Bibliography Index