Throughout the decade that predated the 1967 war, Jordans declared views regarding Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict were not basically different from those of the Arab consensus. Namely, rejection of Israels legitimacy. In the wake of the war King Hussein was the first Arab leader to realise that in order to regain the recently lost territories, which he considered a most vital and urgent task, he (and the other heads of state) would have to offer Israel a meaningful quid pro quo. Hence the shift in Jordans policy was twofold: (1) A change of the traditional statements that had been made by the King and his officials prior to June 1967; and (2) a change in the views expressed by Jordanian spokespersons vis-a-vis the declarations of other Arab leaders.
Joseph Nevo is a Professor at the Department of Middle East History and a senior fellow at the Center for Gulf Studies in the University of Haifa. He was a senior associate member at the Middle East Centre, in St Antonys College, Oxford and a visiting scholar at Princeton University and at Meiji Gakuwin University (Tokyo). He has published extensively on the modern history of the Middle East, particularly on Jordan, on Saudi Arabia and on the Palestinians.
Introduction; Part I - The Historical Background; Part II: Jordanian Territorial and Conceptual Demands on Israel; Part III: Jordan's Options and its Quid Pro Quo; Conclusion.