The enormous growth of the state occurring over much of this century has led the authors of this book to re-examine the proper relationship between the American people and their government.
The authors first analyse the case for limiting governmental power and discuss which limits are appropriate, including tax and regulatory limits and electoral, congressional term and constitutional limits. They also examine possible auxiliary sources of state limitation, such as technological and economic limitations, informal order and lessons to be learned from local government. In sum, this book provides a seminal analysis of the necessity of limiting state power in order to preserve human rights.
Limiting Leviathan will be a valuable reference point for scholars of public choice and government institutions.
Edited by Donald P. Racheter, Executive Director, Public Interest Institute and Richard E. Wagner, Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, George Mason University, US
Contents: Preface 1. Faustian Bargains and Constitutional Governance Part I: Why Should Government be Limited? 2. The Purpose and Limits of Government 3. Constitutionally-Limited Government versus Popular Democracy 4. Government: An Expensive Provider Part II: Which Limits on Government are Appropriate? 5. Constitutional Limits Versus Statutory Rules 6. Constitutional Spending Limitations and the Optimal Size of Government 7. Tax Limits 8. Regulatory Limits 9. The Case for Congressional Term Limits is the Same as the Case for Pollution Control 10. Electoral Limits Part III: Are Auxiliary Precautions Needed? 11. Federalist Theory and Polycentricity: Learning from Local Governments 12. Searching for Order: The Costly Interaction of Formal and Informal Systems 13. Technological and Economic Limitations on Governments Index