Rational Choice Politics (Sage Library of Political Science)

Rational Choice Politics (Sage Library of Political Science)

By: Keith M. Dowding (editor), Kenneth A. Shepsle (editor), Torun Dewan (editor)Hardback

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Description

The formal modeling techniques of rational choice theory have become central to the discipline of political science, for example with regard to the understanding of the working of legislatures, coalition governments, executive-bureaucracy relations or electoral systems. The collection includes the very best work in this field, as well as an editors' introduction to each volume that describes the importance of the articles and their place in political science. Volume I: Social Choice and Equilibrium Volume II: Voting, Elections and Electoral Systems Volume III: Legislatures and Pressure Politics Volume IV: Bureaucracy, Constitutional Arrangements and the State

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Contents

VOLUME 1: SOCIAL CHOICE AND EQUILIBRIUM Part 1: Social Choice On the Rationale of Group Decision-making - Duncan Black A Direct Proof of Arrow' s Theorem - Julian H. Blau A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions - Amaryta Sen Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result - Allan Gibbard Part 2: Equilibrium A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule - Charles R. Plott Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control - Richard D. McKelvey Generic Instability of Majority Rule - Norman Schofield Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions - William H. Riker On 64%-Majority Rule - Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice - Richard D McKelvey The Uncovered Set and the Core - Gary C. Cox Bargaining in Legislatures - David P. Baron and John Ferejohn A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice - Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan Part 3: Electoral Systems Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions - Gary Cox A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout - Timothy J. Fedderson Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems - Massimo Morelli VOLUME 2: VOTING, ELECTIONS AND PRESSURE POLITICS Part 4: Voting and Elections A Theory of the Calculus of Voting - William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty - Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal The Swing Voter's Curse - Timothy J. Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer Voting as Communicating - Thomas Pickety The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model - Robert J. Barro Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control - John Ferejohn Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty and convergence - Randall L. Calvert Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two Party System with Rational Voters - Alberto Alesina An Economic Model of Representative Democracy - Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium - Gerald H. Kramer Elections, Coalitions, and Outcomes - David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks Elections, Governments and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems Pressure Politics - David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier Part 5: Pressure Politics The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft - Gordon Tullock The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society - Anne O. Krueger A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence - Gary Becker On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests - Stephen Coates and Stephen Morris Legislators and Interest Groups: How unorganized interests get represented - Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger Protection for Sale - Gene Grossman and Elhanen Helpman The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective - William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner VOLUME 3: LEGISLATURES Part 6: Bureaucracy Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas - David Austen-Smith Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior - Arthur T. Denzau and Robert J. Mackay Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure - Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Fedderson Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures - Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting - John Ferejohn, Fiorina P. Morris and Richard D. McKelvey Collective Decision Making and Standing Committee: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures - Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel Buying Supermajorities - Timothy Groseclose and James Snyder Where's the Party? - Keith Krehbiel On Division of the Question - John B. Kadane Coalitions and Cabinet Government - Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle Committee Design with Endogenous Information - Nicola Persico Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo - Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal Modelling the Interaction of Parties, Activists and Voters: Why is the political center empty? - Norman Schofield and Itai Sened Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Voting Models - Kenneth A. Shepsle The Industrial Organization of Congress - Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall VOLUME 4: BUREAUCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE STATE Part 7: Bureaucracy Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing - Jeffrey S. Banks Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A model of deception and monitoring in budgeting - Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor and Roland Van Gaalen Delegation and the Structure of Policy-Making: A transactions cost politics approach - David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloren Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy - John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control - Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms - Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz Part 8: Constitutional Arrangements The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development - Barry R. Weingast A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures - Charles M. Tiebout An Economic Theory of Clubs - James M. Buchanan The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in government - Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto players and presidentialism, parliamentarism, multi-cameralism, and multipartism - George Tsebelis Part 9: The State Dictatorship, Democracy and Development - Mancur Olson Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century england - Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The case of the merchant guild - Anver Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast A Rational Theory of the Size of Government - Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard Comparative Politics and Public Finance - Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini A Theory of Political Transitions - Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

Product Details

  • publication date: 18/02/2009
  • ISBN13: 9781412945028
  • Format: Hardback
  • Number Of Pages: 1688
  • ID: 9781412945028
  • ISBN10: 141294502X

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