Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory)

Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory)

By: Gerhard Preyer (author), Frank Siebelt (author)Hardback

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Description

If asked what Humeanism could mean today, there is no other philosopher to turn to whose work covers such a wide range of topics from a unified Humean perspective as that of David Lewis. The core of Lewis's many contributions to philosophy, including his work in philosophical ontology, intensional logic and semantics, probability and decision theory, topics within philosophy of science as well as a distinguished philosophy of mind, can be understood as the development of philosophical position that is centered around his conception of Humean supervenience. If we accept the thesis that it is physical science and not philosophical reasoning that will eventually arrive at the basic constituents of all matter pertaining to our world, then Humean supervenience is the assumption that all truths about our world will supervene on the class of physical truths in the following sense: There are no truths in any compartment of our world that cannot be accounted for in terms of differences and similarities among those properties and external space-time relations that are fundamental to our world according to physical science.

About Author

Gerhard Preyer is professor of social science at J. W. Goethe University in Frankfurt. Frank Siebelt is professor of philosophy at J. W. Goethe University in Frankfurt.

Contents

Part 1 Modal Realism Chapter 2 Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality Chapter 3 Time Travel Fiction Chapter 4 Counting the Cost of Modal Realism Chapter 5 Against Against Overlap and Endurance Chapter 6 The Case for Perdurance Part 7 Physicalism, Causation, and Conditionals Chapter 8 Naturalism for the Faint of Heart Chapter 9 Going through the Open Door Again: Counterfactual vs. Singularist theories of Causation Chapter 10 On Forward and Backward Counterfactual Conditions Part 11 Reduction of Mind Chapter 12 Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind Chapter 13 Knowing What It Is like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument Chapter 14 Index Chapter 15 Reality and Humean Supervenience: Some Essays on David Lewis's Philosophy

Product Details

  • ISBN13: 9780742512009
  • Format: Hardback
  • Number Of Pages: 264
  • ID: 9780742512009
  • weight: 454
  • ISBN10: 0742512002

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