The siting of locally obnoxious but nationally relevant and necessary facilities such as sewage treatment plants, landfills, dams and nuclear power stations is an important issue in public policy planning. In view of the negative externalities such as declining property prices, health threats, and air, water and noise pollution imposed on the local communities that house them, the location of these facilities generates a consensus among the general public aptly termed `not-in-my-backyard' or NIMBY syndrome.
Drawing on the experiences of North America, Europe, Oceania and Asia, this book offers a comprehensive review of existing conflict-resolution instruments used in the siting of these facilities. The authors highlight in particular legal and command instruments such as zoning and compulsory acquisition of land, and economic incentives such as compensation and mitigation.
Using elements from areas such as game theory and risk analysis and the use of compensation auction mechanisms, the authors present a series of decision steps to provide a credible alternative methodology designed to minimise such conflicts. This innovative study will be welcomed by all those with an interest in environmental and public policy planning.
Euston Quah, Associate Professor and Head, Division of Economics and Co-Director, Economic Growth Centre, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and K.C. Tan, Associate Professor, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Contents: Preface Part I: The Siting Dilemma 1. Introduction 2. Nature of NIMBY Facilities Part II: Existing Solutions and Economic Valuation 3. Conflict Resolution Instruments and General Compensation 4. Environmental Valuation Part III: Alternative Solutions and Auctions 5. Nature and Types of Auctions 6. Review of Compensation Auction Methods Part IV: The Siting Process 7. Some Experiments on Compensation Auction Methods 8. Risk Analysis and Uncertainty 9. Sequential Multi-Stage Criteria for Siting NIMBYs 10. Conclusion Bibliography Index