There is a widely held belief in the imminent probability of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction being used by terrorists against civilian targets. This edited volume critically assesses the suggestion that one safeguard against this possibility would be to strengthen existing international prohibitions against state- level acquisition of such weapons.
A glimpse of the possible potential of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction has been seen through the actions of the Tokyo Aum group, and through the use of chlorine by insurgents in Iraq. However, the extent of the real threat posed is as yet unclear, and safeguarding against it in developing countries will not be easy. This book assembles specialists in each category of WMD in order to examine the potential of expanding the three `classical' arms control treaties in order to combat the threat posed by smaller terrorist groups, and draws conclusions as to the strengths and weaknesses of this suggestion.
Ian Bellany is Emeritus Professor of Politics at Lancaster University. He has written or co- written a total of ten books on aspects of international security.
Introduction General 1. Material Dangers Bellany 2. Manufacturing the Means of Apocalypse: Aum Shinrikyo and the Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction Reader Chemical and Biological 3. Chemical and Biological Terrorism and Multilateral Conventions Spiers 4. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention: Confronting the Threat of International Terrorism Feakes 5. The Status of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in Relation to the Prevention of Bioterrorism Sims 6. Verification under the Chemical Weapons Convention Manley Nuclear 7. Francis: The Diversion of Nuclear Materials for Terrorist Use 8. Arms Control, Game Theory and the Twenty-First Century Kilgour