Constitutional democracy is at once a flourishing idea filled with optimism and promise--and an enterprise fraught with limitations. Uncovering the reasons for this ambivalence, this book looks at the difficulties of constitutional democracy, and reexamines fundamental questions: What is constitutional democracy? When does it succeed or fail? Can constitutional democracies conduct war? Can they preserve their values and institutions while addressing new forms of global interdependence? The authors gathered here interrogate constitutional democracy's meaning in order to illuminate its future. The book examines key themes--the issues of constitutional failure; the problem of emergency power and whether constitutions should be suspended when emergencies arise; the dilemmas faced when constitutions provide and restrict executive power during wartime; and whether constitutions can adapt to such globalization challenges as immigration, religious resurgence, and nuclear arms proliferation.
In addition to the editors, the contributors are Sotirios Barber, Joseph Bessette, Mark Brandon, Daniel Deudney, Christopher Eisgruber, James Fleming, William Harris II, Ran Hirschl, Gary Jacobsohn, Benjamin Kleinerman, Jan-Werner Mller, Kim Scheppele, Rogers Smith, Adrian Vermeule, and Mariah Zeisberg.
Jeffrey K. Tulis teaches political science at the University of Texas, Austin. His books include "The Rhetorical Presidency" (Princeton). Stephen Macedo is the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics at Princeton University. His numerous books include "Democracy at Risk".
P> Introduction. Constitutional Boundaries by Jeffrey K. Tulis and Stephen Macedo 1 Part I: What Is Constitutional Failure? 11 Chapter 1: Constitutional Failure: Ultimately Attitudinal by Sotirios A. Barber 13 Chapter 2: Successful Failures of the American Constitution by James E. Fleming 29 Chapter 3: The Disharmonic Constitution by Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn 47 Chapter 4: Constitution of Failure The Architectonics of a Well-Founded Constitutional Order by William F. Harris II 66 Part II: How Can Constitutional Democracy Contend with Emergency 89 Chapter 5: "In the Name of National Security" Executive Discretion and Congressional Legislation in the Civil War and World War I by Benjamin A. Kleinerman 91 Chapter 6: The Possibility of Constitutional Statesmanship by Jeffrey K. Tulis 112 Chapter 7: Exceptions That Prove the Rule Embedding Emergency Government in Everyday Constitutional Life by Kim Lane Scheppele 124 Part III: How Can Constitutional Democracy Contend with War? 155 Chapter 8: The Glorious Commander in Chief by Adrian Vermeule 157 Chapter 9: The Relational Conception of War Powers by Mariah Zeisberg 168 Chapter 10: Confronting War Rethinking Jackson's Concurrence in Youngstown v. Sawyer by Joseph M. Bessette 194 Chapter 11: War and Constitutional Change by Mark E. Brandon 217 Part IV: How Can Constitutional Democracy Contend with Globalization 237 Chapter 12: Three Constitutionalist Reponses to Globalization by Jan -Werner Muller 239 Chapter 13: Constitutionalism in a Theocratic World by Ran Hirschl 256 Chapter 14: Constitutional Democracies, Coercion, and Obligations to Include by Rogers M. Smith 280 Chapter 15: Omniviolence, Arms Control, and Limited Government by Daniel Deudney 297 Conclusion: Constitutional Engagement and Its Limits by Christopher L. Eisgruber 317 List of Contributors 329 Index 333