The Loss of Java explains in detail the air, sea and land battles between the Allied and Japanese armed forces during the battle for Java that followed the evacuation of southern Sumatra in February 1942. Little has been written about the allied air campaign, or about why Dutch forces fought just one major land battle with the Japanese, the Battle of the Tjiater Pass, in the later stages of the struggle. The Loss of Java shows that the strategy adopted by the Dutch grew out of a carefully-devised plan of defence, and that the battle of Java comprised not one (the Battle of the Java Sea) but four major engagements with the Japanese. The generally accepted idea is that the Allies were ineffective in their fight against the Japanese invaders. In fact the Japanese suffered truly serious losses, but Japanese commanders at various levels consciously took steps that exposed their forces to great risk but turned out well for them and put the Allies under great pressure. In the end the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) and the allied forces capitulated on 8 March 1942.