This book contributes to the current debates on the shadow economy and related issues of tax evasion and corruption. The approach taken here is one that will develop a better understanding of these related issues, which are increasingly seen as impediments to country competitiveness and economic growth.
Economists and policymakers are increasingly focused on how the shadow economy operates. The contributors discuss how effective corporate governance may help to reduce both the occurrence and effects of illegal activities. The book begins by considering institutional governance and how issues such as economic growth and development can be better understood by gaining a deeper understanding of the decision-making process. The importance of collective persuasion and collective decision-making in an institutional context is illustrated. The remainder of the work details a series of empirical studies outlining the role of governance and institutional capacity in assessing economic performance, the role of political competition in reducing corruption and measures of, and influences on, corruption in different countries around the world.
Institutions such as the WTO, World Bank and the IMF will find much to engage them in this book as will policy makers in government and research policy agencies. It will also hold great appeal to academics (postgraduate and above) in the fields of political economy, economic development and international economics.
Edited by the late Michael Pickhardt, formerly of Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus, Germany and Edward Shinnick, University College Cork, Ireland
Contents: Preface PART I: OVERVIEW 1. Governance and Illegal Activities: A Survey of Recent Developments and Issues Michael Pickhardt and Edward Shinnick PART II: KEY ISSUES OF INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 2. The Political Economy of Governance and Development: Towards a New Worldview Ismail Adams 3. A Dynamic Theory of Collective Persuasion Athanassios Pitsoulis 4. On the Optimal Sanction Structure When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension Tim Friehe PART III: EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON INSTITUTIONS, GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION AND THE SHADOW ECONOMY 5. Institutional Capacity and the Celtic Tiger Economy: Ireland in Comparative Perspective Frank Barry 6. Reducing Petty Corruption: What Role for a More Competitive Political System? John K. Wilson 7. Shadow Economies and Corruption all over the World: What do we Really Know? Friedrich Schneider 8. Determinants of Shadow Economy in Tunisia and Algeria: A Firm-Level Analysis Clara Delavallade 9. "It's a Lot, But Let It Stay": How Tax Evasion is Perceived Across Italy Carlo Fiorio and Alberto Zanardi 10. Why Do Individuals Evade Payroll and Income Taxation in Estonia? Kenneth A. Kriz, Jaanika Merikull, Alari Paulus, Karsten Staehr Index