Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.
Richard Ned Lebow is Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Janice Gross Stein is Harrison Professor of Conflict Management and Negotiation at the University of Toronto.
PrefaceAbbreviationsCh. 1Introduction3Pt. 1The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962Ch. 2Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives19Ch. 3Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics51Ch. 4Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate?67Ch. 5Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis?94Ch. 6The Crisis and Its Resolution110Pt. 2The Crisis in the Middle East, October 1973Ch. 7The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973149Ch. 8The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts182Ch. 9The Failure to Stop the Fighting198Ch. 10The Failure to Avoid Confrontation226Ch. 11The Crisis and Its Resolution261Pt. 3Deterrence, Compellence, and the Cold WarCh. 12How Crises Are Resolved291Ch. 13Deterrence and Crisis Management324Ch. 14Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons348Postscript. Deterrence and the End of the Cold War369Notes377Appendix523Name Index527General Index535